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Abstract
Several rules for social choice are examined from a unifying point
of view that looks at them as procedures for revising a system of de-
grees of belief in accordance with certain specified logical constraints.
Belief is here a social attribute, its degrees being measured by the
fraction of people who share a given opinion. Different known rules
and some new ones are obtained depending on which particular con-
straints are assumed. These constraints allow to model different no-
tions of choiceness. In particular, we give a new method to deal with
approval-disapproval-preferential voting.
Keywords: Social choice theory, degrees of belief, preferences, tran-
sitivity, Condorcet-Smith principle, choiceness, supremacy, plurality
rule, minimax rule, prominence, Condorcet principle, maximin rule,
comprehensive prominence, refined comprehensive prominence, good-
ness, approval voting, approval-preferential voting.
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1 Introduction
In this article we develop certain applications of a method for revising degrees
of belief that we introduced in [8]. These applications belong to social choice
theory. As general references about the latter, we refer the reader to [18, 19,
25].
1The original version of this article had the title “Choosing and ranking. Let’s be
logical about it.”
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1.1 As its name says, the main subject matter of social choice theory is
choosing among several options in accordance with the existing preferences
about them. It is indeed a question of aggregating a set of individual opinions
so as to define a collective one. The individual opinions will usually have an
all-or-none character. For instance, given two options x and y , either x is
preferred to y or viceversa. Or, given a single option x, either it is considered
a right choice or it is not. Putting together several opinions of this kind results
in a more quantitative sort of information: every particular statement, such
as ‘x is preferable to y ’, or ‘x is a right choice’, is now valued by the fraction
of people who have expressed this view. This fraction can be assimilated to
a degree of collective belief in that statement.
If a collective decision must be adopted, it would be reasonable to abide
by the majority, i. e. to accept a statement whenever that fraction is larger
than one half.
But it is not so simple. Preferences are usually assumed to be transitive;
besides, it is taken for granted that an option deserves being chosen if and
only if it is preferred to any other. However, it is well known (see for instance
[19, § 7.1] and [25, ch. 9]) that these standard assumptions cannot be main-
tained when preferences are aggregated and one tries to decide by means
of the majority criterion. Consider, for instance, three options a, b, c and
15 voters —or 15 millions of them— who rank these options in the following
way:
6 : a≻b≻c, 5 : b≻c≻a, 4 : c≻a≻b. (1)
The number that precedes each of these rankings indicates how many people
expressed it. From this information one sees that a is preferred to b by a
majority of people, namely 10 against 5. Similarly, b is preferred to c by a
majority of 11 against 4, and c is preferred to a by a majority of 9 against
6. These numbers are collected in the following table, that we call the Llull
matrix of the vote:2
a 10 6
5 b 11
9 4 c
. (2)
So the majoritarian preferences are not transitive; in fact, they form a cycle.
Besides, they do not produce an option with the property of being preferred
to every other.
2Since we are interested only in the preferences of x over y for x 6= y , we use the
diagonal cells for specifying the simultaneous labelling of rows and columns by the existing
options. The cell located in row x and column y gives information about the preference
of x over y .
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This is a particular case of the general problem of judgment aggregation
[16, 17], where a group of people wants to decide on several issues that are
subject to certain logical constraints. Even when each individual gives an
opinion that is consistent with these logical constraints, the aggregate opinion
defined by the majority criterion can lose such a consistency. This poses the
problem of which method should be used to arrive at a consistent decision.
We dealt with this problem in [8]. Our method, that will be summarized
in § 2, hinges on a clear statement of the logical constraints that relate the
issues in question to each other. Every issue is represented by an atomic
proposition and every constraint is represented by a compound proposition
whose truth is assumed to hold.
In social choice theory, one is interested in the propositions pxy : ‘x is
preferable to y ’, and qx : ‘x is a right choice’, where x and y vary over the
set of options. The standard notion of preference assumes the constraints
of antisymmetry, namely pxy ↔ pyx for any x, y different from each other,
and transitivity, namely pxy ∧ pyz → pxz for any x, y, z pairwise different
from each other. However, in most of this article we will drop the constraint
of transitivity and we will keep only that of antisymmetry. The reason for
it is that the notion of choiceness, i. e. being a right choice, is not really
concerned with transitivity. In fact, social choice theory often distinguishes
between choice functions and ranking functions (see for instance [28] and [1]).
Even if we equate choiceness to being preferred to anything else, this
corresponds simply to the constraint qx ↔
∧
y 6=x pxy. We will refer to this
notion of choiceness as supremacy.
Besides it, we will consider also other notions. For instance, instead of
the preceding double-implication constraint, it makes sense to require only
the single implications
∧
y 6=x pxy → qx and
∧
y 6=x pyx → qx. The first of
these is related to the classical principle of Llull and Condorcet, namely that
an option should be chosen if it is preferred to every other by a majority.
These implications define an alternative notion of choiceness that we call
prominence.
Properly speaking, however, having definite binary preferences between
options does not preclude the possibility that none of them is considered good
enough, or that all of them are considered so. This is very much the idea of
approval voting [5]. Of course, if x is considered good and y is preferred to x
then y should also be considered good, that is, we are constrained to satisfy
the implication qx ∧ pyx → qy . This notion of choiceness will be referred to
as goodness.
Quite interestingly, Condorcet himself advocated for such a relaxation
of the notion of choiceness. In 1789, four years after his celebrated Essai
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where he considered the above-mentioned principle, he expressed himself in
the following way: “It is generally more important to be sure of electing men
who are worthy of holding office than to have a small probability of electing
the worthiest man” [9].
Let us remark here that later on the notation qx will be replaced by differ-
ent symbols —namely, sx, tx, gx— depending on which notion of choiceness
is being considered.
1.2 Assume that several individuals are asked not only to rank a set of
options, but also to indicate which of them meet their approval. Of course,
each individual is supposed to be consistent at putting his approved options
at the top of his ranking. Once again, however, the majority criterion can
produce an inconsistent result. Assume, for instance, that the votes are as
follows:
5 : a≻b≻c |, 4 : b≻a≻c |, 8 : b |a≻c, 9 : c |a≻b, (3)
where a vertical bar indicates that the options at the left of it are approved
whereas those at the right are disapproved. By counting the preferences
about every pair of options, we get the following Llull matrix:
a 14 17
12 b 17
9 9 c
. (4)
In contrast to (2), here the majority criterion results in a complete order-
ing, namely a≻ b≻ c. However, if we count the number of approvals and
disapprovals that are present in (3), we see that option a is disapproved by
a majority, namely by 17 individuals, whereas b is approved by a majority
consisting also of 17 individuals and c is approved by a majority of 18 in-
dividuals. So, the option that goes first in the obtained ranking is the most
disapproved one! Which option should be chosen in such a situation?
1.3 As we have already mentioned, we will be looking at those numbers of
people as degrees of (collective) belief, and we will revise them in the light
of the assumed constraints. Our revision method, that was introduced in
[8], is based on the following general principle: an implication of the form
(p1∧p2∧· · ·∧pn)→ q with a satisfiable left-hand side gives to its conclusion q
at least the same degree of belief as the weakest of the premises pi .
This principle has been used by several authors (see especially [21]) and
it can be traced back to ancient philosophy, where it was stated by saying
that peiorem semper conclusio sequitur partem.
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Let us illustrate our usage of this principle in the case of (1), where we
saw that the collective preferences defined by the majority criterion are not
consistent with transitivity.
For each pair of options x and y , the preference pxy is supported by
the number of people indicated in the table (2). We view these numbers as
degrees of collective belief. From a theoretical point of view, it is natural to
normalize them to the interval [0, 1] by considering their ratio to the total
number of voters V, 15 in this case. However, in practical cases like this one
it is more convenient to stay with the numbers of people, since they are small
integers. In the following we denote these numbers by V (pxy) and v(pxy),
the latter being the normalized ones, that is v(pxy) = V (pxy)/V.
The lack of consistency with transitivity occurs in the following way: a
is collectively preferred to b since V (pab) = 10 > 5 = V (pba), b is collec-
tively preferred to c since V (pbc) = 11 > 4 = V (pcb), but c is collectively
preferred to a since V (pca) = 9 > 6 = V (pac). This is not consistent with
the implication that defines transitivity, namely pab ∧ pbc → pac . However,
if we assume this implication to be true, then the above-mentioned principle
of the weakest premise allows to increase the degree of belief in pac to the
value V ∗(pac) = min(V (pab), V (pbc)) = 10.
By proceeding in this way with all triads of options, we arrive at the
following revised degrees of belief:
(V ∗(pxy)) =
a 10 10
9 b 11
9 9 c
. (5)
One can easily check that these new degrees of belief are not increased by
applying the same procedure again. However, for a larger number of options
one would be led to a repeated application of the same procedure for all
triads of options, or equivalently, to a similar procedure involving longer
implications such as pab ∧ pbc ∧ pcd → pad . Anyway, we will see that the final
degrees of belief are always consistent with transitivity. More specifically,
transitivity is ensured if one redefines the collective preferences by considering
x preferred to y whenever V ∗(pxy) > V
∗(pyx).
Although it has to do with other constraints, the inconsistency that we
have seen to arise from (3) can also be resolved by a similar procedure (that
happens to choose neither a nor c, but b!).
In fact, in the next section we will see that this procedure can be extended
to quite general logical constraints and that it enjoys several desirable prop-
erties.
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In subsequent sections we will apply it to the different notions of choice-
ness that have been pointed out above.
As we will see, depending on which particular constraints are adopted,
as well as other details, one obtains a variety of rules for social choice.
These rules will include some well-known ones, such as plurality, maximin,
Schulze’s method of paths and approval voting. On the other hand, we will
also obtain some new rules, such as a new Condorcet rule that we call the
“comprehensive prominence method” and a new method for dealing with
approval-disapproval-preferential voting (the reader specifically interested in
this particular application can skip sections 4–6).
Anyway, our method provides a common framework that reveals the pre-
cise logic behind each of these rules.
2 General framework
In this section we summarize the general method given in [8]. Its aim is to
revise the existing degrees of belief about several logically constrained issues
and to arrive at consistent decisions about them.
2.1 The issues under consideration are represented by a finite set of basic
logical propositions together with the corresponding negations. This set of
propositions —their negations included— will be denoted as Π , and the
negation of p will be denoted as p. The elements of Π are referred to as
literals.
The logical constraints between issues are referred to as the doctrine.
They are specified by a set of compound propositions that are required
to be true. This entails a series of material implications between literals
that are conveniently codified by rewriting the set of those constraints in
conjunctive normal form, i. e. in the form
Φ(D) :=
∧
C∈D
( ∨
p∈C
p
)
, (6)
where D stands for a certain collection of subsets of Π . Each expression
within parentheses in the preceding formula —or equivalently the correspond-
ing set C ⊂ Π— is called a clause.
The conjunctive normal form of a doctrine is not unique. Generally speak-
ing, this can make a difference for the procedure that we are about to in-
troduce. This ambiguity is eliminated by resorting to the Blake canonical
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form, that consists of all the prime clauses of the doctrine under considera-
tion; a clause being prime means that no proper subset of it is still entailed
by the doctrine. However, for many doctrines one is ensured to get the same
results with other conjunctive normal forms made of prime clauses. Such a
form will be said to be ∗-equivalent to the Blake canonical one. In par-
ticular, this happens whenever the form under consideration has a property
that we call disjoint-resolvability. For these and other technical matters
we refer the reader to [8, § 4]. Anyway, the doctrine, that from now on we
are assimilating to the set D , is required to satisfy the following conditions:
(D1) It is satisfiable. (D2) It does not contain unit clauses, i. e. clauses with
a single literal. (D3) It explicitly contains the tertium non datur clause p∨p
for any p ∈ Π . (D4) It is made of prime clauses.
2.2 A system of degrees of belief is represented by a mapping w from Π
to the interval [0, 1]. We refer to such a mapping as a valuation, and
the image of p ∈ Π by a particular valuation w will be denoted as wp or
w(p). A valuation w is called balanced when wp+wp is equal to 1 for any
p ∈ Π . The truth assignments of classical logic are balanced valuations
with all-or-none values, that is either 0 or 1. In contrast, degrees of belief
can take fractional values; besides, they need not be balanced: wp + wp
may be less than 1 (lack of information) or even greater than 1 (presence
of contradiction). In our approach, the latter case can arise because of the
logical implications contained in the constraints.
We will also make use of partial truth assignments. They will be
seen as balanced valuations with values in {0, 1
2
, 1} , where the value 1
2
can
be interpreted as ‘undefined’ or ‘undecided’. Partial truth assignments will be
used mainly for specifying decisions, on which case the values 1, 0 and 1
2
can
be interpreted as meaning respectively ‘accepted’, ‘rejected’ and ‘undecided’.
A partial truth assignment u will be said to be definitely consistent
with D , or with Φ(D), when, for each clause C ∈ D and every p ∈ C , the
following implication holds: if uα = 0 for every α ∈ C \ {p} , then up = 1.
When no undecidedness is present, definite consistency is equivalent to saying
that the truth assignment under consideration makes true the formula Φ(D).
When undecidedness is allowed, definite consistency requires every clause to
contain at least one accepted literal, or alternatively, at least two undecided
literals.
Every valuation w gives rise to a (partial) decision in the following way,
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that depends on a parameter η in the interval 0 ≤ η ≤ 1: For any p ∈ Π ,
p is accepted and p is rejected whenever wp − wp > η, (7)
p and p are left undecided whenever |wp − wp | ≤ η. (8)
We will refer to it as the decision of margin η associated with w , and we
will identify it with the corresponding partial truth assignment. In the case
η = 0 we will call it the basic decision associated with w . In tune with
these definitions, the difference wp − wp will be called the acceptability
of p according to w . If the valuation w is balanced, then the basic decision
criterion is equivalent to the majority rule, namely accepting p and rejecting
p whenever wp >
1
2
.
2.3 A clause being true means that at least one of its literals is true; in other
words, if all of its literals but one are known to be false, then the remaining
one must be true. Therefore, the doctrine associated with (6) provides the
following implications:
p ←
∧
α∈C
α6=p
α, (9)
for any C ∈ D such that p ∈ C . Each of these implications is a possible
source of belief in p. In this connection, it makes sense to apply the classical
rule that the conclusion p should be believed at least as the weakest of the
premises α . This rule requires the right-hand side of (9) to be satisfiable,
which is ensured because C is prime. This leads to the following procedure
for revising any given degrees of belief v about Π : every p ∈ Π should be
believed at least in the new degree v′p defined by
v′p = max
C∈D
C∋p
min
α∈C
α6=p
vα, (10)
One easily checks the truth of the following statement:
Lemma 2.1 ([8, Lem. 3.1]). The transformation v 7→ v′ has the following
properties:
(a) It is continuous.
(b) v ≤ w implies v′ ≤ w′ .
(c) v ≤ v′ .
(d) The image set of v′ is contained in that of v .
As soon as we accept v′ as new degrees of belief, it makes sense to repeat
the same operation with v replaced by v′ , thus obtaining a still higher valu-
ation v′′ , and so on. By proceeding in this way, one obtains a non-decreasing
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sequence of valuations v(n) (n = 0, 1, 2, . . . ) with the property that all of
them take values in the same finite set. Obviously, this implies that this
sequence will eventually reach an invariant state v∗ . This eventual valuation
is, by definition, the upper revised valuation.
2.4 The main properties of the upper revised valuation are collected in the
following statements:
Theorem 2.2 (Basic facts [8, Thm. 3.2]). The transformation v 7→ v∗ has
the following properties:
(a) It is continuous.
(b) v ≤ w implies v∗ ≤ w∗ .
(c) v ≤ v∗ .
(d) The image set of v∗ is contained in that of v .
Theorem 2.3 (Characterization [8, Thm. 3.3]). The upper revised valuation
v∗ is the lowest of the valuations w that lie above v and are consistent with
the doctrine in the sense of satisfying the equation w′ = w .
Theorem 2.4 (Consistency of the associated decisions [8, Cor. 3.7]). For
any η in the interval 0≤η≤1, the decision of margin η associated with the
upper revised valuation is always definitely consistent with the doctrine.
Theorem 2.5 (Respect for consistent majority decisions [8, Thm. 3.9]).
Assume that every p ∈ Π satisfies either vp >
1
2
> vp or, contrarily,
vp >
1
2
> vp . Assume also that the basic decision associated with v (which
contains no undecidedness) is consistent with the doctrine. In this case, the
basic decision associated with the upper revised valuation v∗ is the same.
Theorem 2.6 (Respect for unanimity [8, Thm. 3.11]). Assume that v is
an aggregate of consistent truth assignments. In this case, having vp = 1
implies that p is accepted by the basic decision associated with the upper
revised valuation v∗ .
Theorem 2.7 (Monotonicity [8, Thm. 3.14 and Cor. 3.15]). Assume that
the valuation v is modified into a new one v˜ such that
v˜p > vp, v˜q = vq, ∀q ∈ Π \ {p}. (11)
In this case, the acceptability of p either increases or stays constant:
v˜∗p − v˜
∗
p ≥ v
∗
p − v
∗
p. (12)
As a consequence, if p is accepted [resp. not rejected ] in the decision of
margin η associated with v∗ , then it is also accepted [resp. not rejected ]
in the decision of margin η associated with v˜∗ .
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2.5 Having the equality v∗p = v
′
p for the Blake canonical form —or for any
disjoint-resolvable prime conjunctive normal form— guarantees that the de-
gree of belief v∗p does not derive from unsatisfiable conjunctions [8, § 4.3].
If that equality holds no matter the initial valuation v , we say that the
doctrine under consideration is unquestionable for p. Sometimes, the
equality can be guaranteed only under certain special circumstances. In par-
ticular, it can happen that it holds whenever p is accepted according to v∗ ;
in that case we say that the doctrine is unquestionable for p when ac-
cepted. Sufficient conditions for ensuring such properties are given in [8,
Thm. 4.8, Cor. 4.9].
2.6 The following fact will be useful for computations:
Lemma 2.8. The successive valuations v(n) satisfy the following formula
for any n ≥ 1:
v(n)p = max
(
vp, max
C∈D
C∋p
C 6={p,p}
min
α∈C
α6=p
v
(n−1)
α
)
. (13)
Proof. By definition, v(n) is obtained from v(n−1) by the transformation
v 7→ v′ defined by (10). The resulting expression is the same as (13) ex-
cept that the right-hand side shows v
(n−1)
p instead of vp . In order to ob-
tain formula (13) it suffices to apply repeatedly the two following facts,
which are easily checked by induction: (i) If an (n ≥ 0) satisfies an =
max(an−1, bn−1) (n ≥ 1), where bn (n ≥ 0) is a non-decreasing sequence,
then an = max(a0, bn−1) for any n ≥ 1; (ii) If an and bn (n ≥ 0) are
non-decreasing sequences, then the sequences max(an, bn) and min(an, bn)
are also non-decreasing.
2.7 For our purposes, p need not be the exact semantic negation of p.
Instead, quite often it is more appropriate to look at p as the opposite,
or antithesis, of p. This may seem to conflict with the excluded-middle
principle p ∨ p . However, this principle somehow loses its character just as
fractional valuations come in. In fact, its role in connection with the latter
is only through the excluded-middle clauses that we systematically include
in the Blake canonical form; and this has only the following two effects:
(a) providing the trivial implications p → p and p → p, through which the
revised degrees of belief become larger than or equal to the original ones; and
(b) forbidding any implication of the form p ∧ p ∧ χ → t, which would be
a gratuitous source of belief (this effect occurs because clauses are restricted
to be prime, which prevents them from containing p ∨ p).
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Anyway, the belief in p is not the lack of belief in p, but it should have
its own reasons. This agrees with the general views of [20, see for instance
p. 12]. Besides, it fully agrees also with the traditional views of the adversarial
system of justice.
In order to apply the preceding method to a particular matter, one must
specify the main issues at stake as well as the existing logical implications
between them. As we will see, the notions of preference and choiceness allow
for several views about which logical implications are associated with them.
As a result we will obtain several alternative models and rules for social
choice.
3 Preferences
In the sequel we will be dealing all the time with a finite set of options. This
set will be denoted as A. A system of preferences about the members of A
is usually formalized as a binary relation on A that complies with certain
properties, typically including antisymmetry, completeness and transitivity
(see for instance [15]). Having said that, nowadays it is well established that
preferences are sometimes not transitive (see for instance [26], or [15, § 1.3]).
So, we will take the view that transitivity is a special way of having pref-
erences about things. On the other hand, antisymmetry and completeness
admit of certain alternatives depending on whether indifference and/or lack
of opinion are allowed into consideration; as we will see next, however, these
alternatives become unnecessary when fractional and possibly unbalanced de-
grees of belief are used (recall that a lack of balance means that the degrees
belief associated with p and p need not add up to 1).
Describing preferences by means of propositional logic requires consider-
ing all of the propositions pxy : ‘x is preferable to y ’, where x and y are
different from each other (allowing for x = y leads to useless distinctions).
From our point of view, the main principle associated with the notion of
preference is that pxy can be identified with pyx , or equivalently, that
pxy ↔ pyx, for any two different x, y ∈ A. (14)
In the all-or-none framework of classical logic, this double implication
embodies a limitation to complete strict preferences, leaving no place for
definite indifference (x and y ‘equally good’) nor for incompleteness (lack of
information about the comparison between x and y ).
However, in our context of degrees of belief, both definite indifference
and incompleteness can be suitably modelled if we interpret (14) as an iden-
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tification between pxy and pyx . In fact, incompleteness can be described by
putting v(pxy) = v(pyx) = 0 which means a full lack of belief in pxy as well as
in pyx . On the other hand, definite indifference can be described by putting
v(pxy) = v(pyx) =
1
2
, i. e. by splitting the unit of belief into equal amounts
for the contrary preferences pxy and pyx .
So, from now on we identify pxy with pyx .
The collective degrees of belief about the propositions pxy are given by
v(pxy) =
∑
k
αk v
k(pxy), (15)
where αk are the relative frequencies or weights of the individual opinions v
k .
In preferential voting, the individual opinions are usually expressed in the
form of a ranking, that is, a list of options in order of preference, possibly
truncated or with ties. In order to translate this information into paired
comparisons, we use the following interpretation:
(a) When x and y are both in the list and x is ranked above y (without
a tie), we certainly take vk(pxy) = 1 and v
k(pyx) = 0.
(b) When x and y are both in the list and x is ranked as good as y ,
we take vk(pxy) = v
k(pyx) =
1
2
.
(c) When x is in the list and y is not in it, we take vk(pxy) = 1 and
vk(pyx) = 0.
(d) When neither x nor y are in the list, we take vk(pxy) = v
k(pyx) = 0.
Instead of rule (d), one can consider the possibility of using the following
alternative:
(d ′ ) When neither x nor y are in the list, we interpret that they are
considered equally good (or equally bad), so we proceed as in (b).
This amounts to complete each truncated ranking by appending to it all
the missing options tied to each other. Generally speaking, however, this
interpretation can be criticized in that the added information might not be
really meant by the voter.
The table that collects the numbers v(pxy) given by (15) for all ordered
pairs xy will be called the (normalized) Llull matrix of the vote. This name
refers to Ramon Llull, who already considered such tables in the thirteenth
century [18]. The elements of this matrix satisfy the inequality
v(pxy) + v(pyx) ≤ 1, (16)
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which is inherited from the component valuations vk . When (16) holds with
the equality sign, it means that every individual expressed a comparison
(a preference or a tie) about every pair of options. We will refer to this
situation as the complete case. As we have already remarked, the revised
degrees of belief need not satisfy (16).
4 Transitivity
Let us begin by the notion of choiceness that presupposes a complete or-
dering: the right choice is the option that goes first in the right complete
ordering. So the problem focuses here on arriving at a complete ordering. In
other words, preferences are here constrained to be transitive, i. e. to satisfy
the implications pxy ∧ pyz → pxz . On account of (14), the latter are logically
equivalent to the following clauses:
pxy ∨ pyz ∨ pzx, for any pairwise different x, y, z ∈ A (17)
(where x, y, z have been relabelled). The doctrine that is made of these
clauses will be referred to as the transitivity doctrine.
The properties of disjoint resolvability and unquestionability of this doc-
trine (obtained in Proposition A.1 from appendix A) allow us to express v∗
directly as the result of the one-step transformation associated with the Blake
canonical form, namely:
v∗(pxy) = Max min
(
v(px0x1), v(px1x2), . . . , v(pxn−1xn)
)
, (18)
where the Max operator considers all paths x0x1 . . . xn of length n ≥ 1 from
x0 = x to xn = y with all xi pairwise different.
In this case, our general method corresponds essentially to the method
introduced in 1997 by Markus Schulze (posted in a mailing list about elec-
tion methods; see [22, 23], [25, p. 228–232] and [6, 7]), sometimes called the
method of paths (in the incomplete case, however, it does not coincide with
any of the variants given in [23]). In the way that we have introduced it, it
is clearly a method for ranking all the candidates. Having said that, later
on (§ 6.4) we will see that in the complete case its winners are quite in agree-
ment with a doctrine that does not include transitivity but aims only at
choosing the most prominent option.
As a ranking method, the method of paths complies with the following
extension of the Condorcet principle introduced in 1973 by John H. Smith
[24, § 5]: Assume that the set of candidates is partitioned in two classes X
14 R. Camps, X. Mora, L. Saumell
and Y such that for each member of X and every member of Y there are
more than half of the individual votes where the former is preferred to the
latter; in that case, the social ranking should also prefer each member of X
to any member of Y . The proof can be found in [23, § 4.7] (see also [6, § 10],
[7, Thm. 8.1]). Another interesting property of the method of paths is clone
consistency, also known as independence of clones, which refers to the effect
of replacing a single option c by a set C of several options similar to c; for
more details we refer the reader to [22, § 5.4], [23, § 4.6] as well as [6, § 11],
[7, Thm. 8.2 and 8.3].
Moreover, it has also been shown [6, 7] that this method can be extended
to a continuous rating method that allows to sense the closeness of two can-
didates at the same time that it allows to recognise certain situations that
are quite opposite to a tie.
5 Supremacy
Instead of constraining the binary preferences between several options to
form a total order, one can require only the existence of a supreme option,
i. e. an option that is preferred to any other. Such a constraint is specified
by the disjunctive normal form
∨
x∈A
∧
y∈A
y 6=x
pxy. (19)
Instead of directly bringing (19) into conjunctive normal form, one can arrive
at a much shorter conjunctive formulation by considering the propositions
sx : ‘x is preferred to any other member of A’ (x ∈ A), which are related to
the pxy by the double implications
sx ↔
∧
y∈A
y 6=x
pxy. (20)
By proceeding in this way, we are led to consider the set of propositions
Π = { sx | x ∈ A } ∪ { sx | x ∈ A } ∪ { pxy | x, y ∈ A, x 6= y } together with
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the doctrine formed by the following clauses:
sx ∨
∨
y∈A
y 6=x
pyx, for any x ∈ A; (21)
sx ∨ pxy, for any two different x, y ∈ A; (22)∨
x∈A
sx. (23)
We will refer to it as the supremacy doctrine.
Again, one can see that the preceding clauses lead to the same upper
revised valuation as the corresponding full Blake canonical form (Prop. A.2).
Here we will only notice that the Blake canonical form includes the clauses
sx ∨ sy, for any two different x, y ∈ A, (24)
which are obtained by disjoint resolution between (22) and the clause of the
same form with x and y interchanged with each other (recall that we identify
pxy with pyx ).
The clauses (24) assert that one cannot have two supreme options. Apply-
ing the definite consistency theorem (Theorem 2.4) to these clauses ensures
the following fact: When sx is accepted, then x is the only option with
this property. On the other hand, the same theorem applied to (23) ensures
the following fact: When sz is rejected for any z 6= x, then sx is accepted.
By taking into account that a proposition need not be accepted or rejected
but it can be left undecided, the preceding statement is equivalent to the fol-
lowing one: When sz is not accepted for any z ∈ A, then sz is undecided for
more than one z ∈ A. In the sequel, an option for which sx is not rejected
will be called a supremacy winner.
The one-step revision transformation v 7→ v′ associated with (21–23)
reads as follows: For any x, y ∈ A:
v′(sx) = max
(
v(sx), min
y 6=x
v(sy), min
y 6=x
v(pxy)
)
, (25)
v′(sx) = max
(
v(sx), max
y 6=x
v(pyx)
)
, (26)
v′(pxy) = max
(
v(pxy), v(sx), min
(
v(sy), min
z 6=x
z 6=y
v(pyz)
) )
. (27)
We will use the following notations:
σx = min
y 6=x
v(pxy), τx = max
y 6=x
v(pyx), σxy = min
z 6=x
z 6=y
v(pxz). (28)
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These definitions immediately imply that
σx ≤ v(pxy) ≤ τy, whenever x 6= y. (29)
σxy ≤ v(pxz) ≤ τz, whenever z /∈ {x, y}. (30)
In the sequel we will have to look at the successive valuations v(n) that
are obtained by iterating the transformation (25–27) starting from v(0) = v .
Later on, it will be convenient to allow n to take negative values by putting
v(n)(pxy) = 0 for n < 0. We will also make use of the quantities analogous to
those of (28) with v(n) substituted for v . These quantities will be denoted
by τ
(n)
x , σ
(n)
x , σ
(n)
xy . Obviously, they satisfy inequalities analogous to (29–30).
5.1 The minimax rule
Assume that our choice must be based solely on the Llull matrix (v(pxy)).
In principle, this matrix does not give (direct) information about the (col-
lective) degrees of belief for sx and sx . So, it makes sense to take
v(sx) = v(sx) = 0, for any x ∈ A. (31)
Proposition 5.1. For the initial values (31), the supremacy doctrine gives
v∗(sx) = v
′′(sx) = min
z 6=x
τz , (32)
v∗(sx) = v
′(sx) = τx, (33)
v∗(pxy) = v
′′′(pxy) = max (v(pxy), min
z 6=x
τz). (34)
Proof. Let us introduce the initial values (31) in (25–27). Starting from
v(n)(sx) and using Lemma 2.8, we successively obtain:
v(n)(sx) = τ
(n−1)
x , (35)
v(n)(sx) = max
(
min
y 6=x
τ (n−2)y , σ
(n−1)
x
)
, (36)
v(n)(pxy) = max
(
v(pxy), min
z 6=x
τ (n−3)z , σ
(n−2)
x , min
(
τ (n−2)y , σ
(n−1)
yx )
) )
. (37)
Let us now plug (37) into the definition of τ
(n)
x . By making use of the
inequalities (29–30) and their n-th counterparts, one easily arrives at the in-
equality τ
(n)
x ≤ max(τx, τ
(n−3)
x , τ
(n−2)
x ). By induction, it follows that τ
(n)
x ≤ τx
for n ≥ 0. Since we also know that τ (n)x is not decreasing, we get
τ (n)x = τx, for n ≥ 0. (38)
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Finally, by plugging this result into (35–37) and making use of the inequalities
of the type (29–30), one arrives at the conclusion that
v(n)(sx) = τx, for n ≥ 1; (39)
v(n)(sx) = min
z 6=x
τz, for n ≥ 2; (40)
v(n)(pxy) = max (v(pxy), min
z 6=x
τz), for n ≥ 3. (41)
Corollary 5.2. For the initial values (31), the supremacy winners are the
options x ∈ A that minimize τx = maxy 6=x v(pyx).
We refer to this rule as the minimax rule. In the voting literature, this
term is sometimes associated with several different rules, in which case the
preceding rule is specifically known as “pairwise opposition”. In the complete
case (v(pxy)+v(pyx) = 1) it coincides with the maximin rule, i. e. choosing
the option x ∈ A that maximizes σx = miny 6=x v(pxy) [25, p. 212–213], which
complies with Condorcet’s majority principle (see § 6.1). In the general in-
complete case, however, the minimax rule does not comply with Condorcet’s
principle.
5.2 The plurality rule.
When the Llull matrix comes from preferential voting in the sense that
every vote is an ordered list (possibly restricted to a subset of most preferred
options), then the preceding treatment admits of a serious objection. In fact,
in that case it is natural to adopt certain specific values as initial degrees of
(collective) belief in sx and sx , namely and specifically, the fraction fx of
votes where x is placed at the top of the list, and that of those where some
other option is placed at the top:
v(sx) = fx, v(sx) = f¯x, for any x ∈ A, (42)
where f¯x =
∑
y 6=x fy . Since sx cannot be true for two different options
—clause (24)— in the event of a vote that ties k options at the top, it makes
sense to count it as 1/k -th of a vote for each of the top-placed options.
In the sequel we will refer to fx as the plurality fraction of x, and f¯x
will be called the antiplurality fraction of x. The values of fx cannot
be read from the Llull matrix except in very few special cases. However,
they are easily obtained from the votes themselves. Using this additional
information should lead to better grounded results. Yet we get something
rather unexpected:
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Proposition 5.3. For the initial values (42), the supremacy doctrine gives
v∗(sx) = v
′(sx) = min
z 6=x
f¯z, (43)
v∗(sx) = v(sx) = f¯x, (44)
v∗(pxy) = v
′′(pxy) = max (v(pxy), min
z 6=x
f¯z). (45)
Proof. Let us begin by noticing that the plurality and antiplurality fractions
fx and f¯x are related to the entries of the Llull matrix in the following way:
fx ≤ v(pxy) ≤ f¯y. (46)
This is an immediate consequence of the definitions when the votes are strict
rankings: If x is placed at the top, then x is preferred to any other option y ;
on the other hand, if x is preferred to y , then the top option cannot be y .
A vote that ties k ≥ 2 options at the top contributes also to the three terms
of (46) in agreement with the stated inequalities; in particular, if both x
and y are placed at the top, the respective contributions are 1/k ≤ 1/2 ≤
(k − 1)/k . From (46) and (28–30) it follows that
fx ≤ σx ≤ τy ≤ f¯y, whenever x 6= y. (47)
fx ≤ σxy ≤ τz ≤ f¯z, whenever z /∈ {x, y}. (48)
Let us introduce the initial values (42) in (25–27). Using Lemma 2.8 we
get (for any n ≥ 0):
v(n)(sx) = max
(
fx, min
y 6=x
v(n−1)(sy), σ
(n−1)
x
)
, (49)
v(n)(sx) = max
(
f¯x, τ
(n−1)
x
)
, (50)
v(n)(pxy) = max
(
v(pxy), v
(n−1)(sx), min
(
v(n−1)(sy), σ
(n−1)
yx
) )
. (51)
We will prove by induction that the following inequality holds for any
n ≥ 1:
τ (n)x ≤ f¯x, for every x. (52)
For n = 1 this follows from (51) because of the initial values (42) and the
inequalities (46) and (48). In fact, we get
v′(pxy) = max
(
v(pxy), fx, min
(
f¯y, σyx
) )
≤ f¯y,
which implies τ ′y = maxx 6=y v
′(pxy) ≤ f¯y.
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Assume now that (52) holds for a given n ≥ 1. Using (49–51), we arrive
successively at the following facts:
v(k)(sx) = max
(
f¯x, τ
(k−1)
x
)
= f¯x, whenever 1 ≤ k ≤ n + 1, (53)
since τ
(k−1)
x ≤ τ
(n)
x ≤ f¯x ;
v(n)(sx) = max
(
fx, min
y 6=x
v(n−1)(sy), σ
(n−1)
x
)
= max
(
fx, min
y 6=x
f¯y, σ
(n−1)
x
)
= min
y 6=x
f¯y, (54)
since fx ≤ σx ≤ σ
(n−1)
x ≤ τ
(n−1)
y ≤ τ
(n)
y ≤ f¯y for any y 6= x;
v(n+1)(pxy) = max
(
v(pxy), v
(n)(sx), min
(
v(n)(sy), σ
(n)
yx
) )
= max
(
v(pxy), min
z 6=x
f¯z, min
(
f¯y, σ
(n)
yx
) )
= max
(
v(pxy), min
z 6=x
f¯z
)
,
(55)
since σ
(n)
yx ≤ τ
(n)
z ≤ f¯z for any z 6= x, y ; and finally
τ (n+1)y = max
x 6=y
v(n+1)(pxy) = max
x 6=y
(
max
(
v(pxy), min
z 6=x
f¯z
) )
≤ f¯y,
because of (46). This finishes the proof of (52). As a byproduct we have ob-
tained also (53–55), that entail the equalities (43–45) claimed in the propo-
sition.
Corollary 5.4. For the initial values (42), the supremacy winners are the
plurality winners, i. e. the options x ∈ A that maximize the plurality frac-
tion fx .
Proof. Recall that we have defined a supremacy winner as an option x ∈ A
for with sx is not rejected, i. e. such that v
∗(sx) ≥ v
∗(sx). In view of (43–44),
this is equivalent to say that x minimizes f¯x . Finally, since f¯x =
∑
z 6=x fz =
(
∑
z∈A fz) − fx , minimizing f¯x is equivalent to maximizing the plurality
fraction fx .
This is quite embarrassing: We started from a method that in the com-
plete case complies with the Condorcet principle, thus ruling out the quite
objectionable plurality rule, and now, by adding more information, we have
fallen back into the plurality rule ! A little reflection shows that in order
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to avoid the main drawback of the plurality rule one should not look for
supremacy, but for something slightly different. In fact, the main objection
against the plurality rule —raised by Borda in his seminal paper of 1770–84
[18, ch. 5]— is that one can have a majority of voters for which the plural-
ity winner is the worst option, which is certainly quite undesirable. Notice
that what matters here is the opposition between ‘best’ and ‘worst’, whereas
the supremacy doctrine has to do with the opposition between ‘best’ and
‘not best’.
6 Prominence.
In order to properly deal with the ‘best-worst’ opposition, one is led to replace
supremacy by a weaker concept whose connection to preferences requires
only that ‘best’ implies the presence of that concept and ‘worst’ (instead
of ‘not best’) implies the lack of it. This concept could be viewed as a
sort of tempered supremacy. We will refer to it as ‘prominence’. More
properly speaking, and using the notation tx to represent the proposition
‘x is prominent’, the connection between this concept and preferences is given
by the following two implications: if x is preferred to any other option, then
x is prominent:
∧
y 6=x pxy → tx ; if every option other than x is preferred
to x, then x is not prominent:
∧
y 6=x pyx → tx . In conjunctive normal form
these implications read as follows:
tx ∨
∨
y 6=x
pyx, for any x ∈ A; (56)
tx ∨
∨
y 6=x
pxy, for any x ∈ A; (57)
Concerning the initial values for v(tx) and v(tx), we will take simply
v(tx) = v(tx) = 0, for any x ∈ A. (58)
One could argue that in the case of preferential voting one should proceed
in a different way: In accordance with the implication
∧
y 6=x pxy → tx —
contained in (56)— every top placing of x is a piece of evidence in favour
of tx . Similarly, every last placing of x is a piece of evidence in favour of tx
—by the implication contained in (57). So, one should take
v(tx) = fx, v(tx) = ℓx, for any x ∈ A, (59)
where ℓx denotes the fraction of votes where x is placed last (a vote that
ties k options at the bottom being counted as 1/k -th of a vote for each of
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the bottom-placed options). In the supremacy doctrine a similar change in
the initial values led to an entirely different result. Here, however, the initial
values (59) lead to the same result as (58). This happens because instead of
the second inequality of (46) here we have the following one: ℓy ≤ v(pxy).
This inequality, together with the first inequality of (46), has the following
consequence: no matter whether we start from (58) or from (59), we get
v′(tx) ≥ miny 6=x v(pxy) ≥ fx as well as v
′(tx) ≥ miny 6=x v(pyx) ≥ ℓx . In fact,
the initial values (59) are based on the implications
∧
y 6=x pxy → tx and∧
y 6=x pyx → tx , so they are doing part of the job that will be done anyway
by the revision transformation. If the doctrine includes (56) but not (57)
—as it will be the case in § 6.2— then the preceding considerations hold only
with respect to the first equality of (59).
6.1 The Condorcet principle.
The implication
∧
y 6=x pxy → tx that is coded in clause (56) is akin to
the celebrated Concorcet principle. This principle has the two following
versions:
M1 Condorcet principle (majority version). If an option x has the prop-
erty that v(pxy) >
1
2
for any y 6= x, then x must be chosen as the
winner.
M1 ′ Condorcet principle (margin version). If an option x has the prop-
erty that v(pxy) > v(pyx) for any y 6= x, then x must be chosen as
the winner.
In the complete case v(pxy)+ v(pxy) = 1 (where the Condorcet principle was
originally proposed) these two conditions are equivalent to each other. Gen-
erally speaking, however, condition M1 is weaker than M1 ′ (which makes the
former more compatible with other desirable properties, as it was remarked
in [7, § 1.4]).
On the other hand, the implication
∧
y 6=x pyx → tx coded in clause (57)
corresponds to the dual statement that is usually referred to as the “Con-
dorcet loser criterion”, also with two versions: the majority one requiring
v(pyx) >
1
2
for any y 6= x, and the margin one requiring v(pyx) > v(pxy) for
any y 6= x. In both versions, the conclusion is that x must then be deemed
a loser.
In the sequel, the term Condorcet winner [ resp. loser ] will be un-
derstood in the majority sense, i. e. to denote an option x with the property
that v(pxy) >
1
2
[ resp. v(pyx) >
1
2
] for any y 6= x.
A major difference between our point of view and that of the Condorcet
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principle is that the latter, in both versions M1 and M1 ′ , looks at whether
a certain particular situation happens in the initial (collective) degrees of
belief v . If it does not happen, then no conclusion is arrived at. In contrast,
our method will take the implication
∧
y 6=x pxy → tx , i. e. clause (56), as a
guide for revising those initial degrees of belief so as to arrive at a conclusion
consistent with that implication. In accordance with the definite consistency
theorem (Theorem 2.4), we will have the following property akin to M1 ′ : If
an option x satisfies v∗(pxy) > v
∗(pyx) for any y 6= x, then it satisfies also
v∗(tx) > v
∗(tx), i. e. x is accepted as a prominent option.
This property will be satisfied whenever the doctrine contains the clause
(56). However, these need not be the only options accepted as prominent
ones. Depending on which other clauses are present in the doctrine, other
options might get accepted too.
Another major difference between our point of view and that of the Con-
dorcet principle is that the latter, also in both versions M1 and M1 ′ , aims
at finding out the winner, i. e. choosing a single option, whereas here we
aim, in principle, at finding out all prominent options. In fact, in contrast
to the supremacy doctrine, the clauses (56–57) allow for the possibility of
having several prominent options or having none of them. To the effect of
making a single choice, we will consider two different approaches. The first
one, followed in § 6.2–6.3, is simply to select the option(s) x for which the
proposition tx gets a highest acceptability, which corresponds to deciding by
a large margin. The second approach, is to impose existence and uniqueness
as part of the doctrine.
As we will see in § 6.4, imposing existence and uniqueness motivates
a more comprehensive prominence doctrine that will satisfy not only the
majority version of the Condorcet principle, but also certain generalizations
of it.
6.2 The maximin rule.
In this section we show that the well-known maximin rule [25, p. 212–213],
i. e. selecting the x ∈ A that maximizes σx = miny 6=x v(pxy), corresponds
exactly to keeping only the clauses (56) and applying the highest acceptability
approach.
Often attributed to Simpson (1969) and Kramer (1977), in actual fact
the maximin rule appears already in Duncan Black’s celebrated work of 1958
[2, (i) in p. 208]. The term ‘maximin’ that we are using is taken from [25].
Having said that, all of these authors limited their attention to the complete
case v(pxy)+v(pyx) = 1, where maximizing σx = miny 6=x v(pxy) is equivalent
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to minimizing τx = maxy 6=x v(pyx). In the general case, however, one must
distinguish between these two rules, that we call respectively ‘maximin’ and
‘minimax’ (see § 5.1).
The one-step revision transformation v 7→ v′ associated with the clauses
(56) takes the following form: For any x, y ∈ A:
v′(tx) = max
(
v(tx), min
y 6=x
v(pxy)
)
, (60)
v′(tx) = v(tx), (61)
v′(pxy) = max
(
v(pxy), min
(
v(tx), min
z 6=x
z 6=y
v(pzx)
) )
, (62)
Proposition 6.1. For initial valuations satisfying (58), the doctrine (56)
is unquestionable for all of its propositions and it gives
v∗(tx) = v
′(tx) = σx, (63)
v∗(tx) = v(tx) = 0, (64)
v∗(pxy) = v(pxy), (65)
where σx = miny 6=x v(pxy). Therefore, the most prominent option is the
x ∈ A that maximizes σx .
Proof. Equalities (63–65) are easily obtained by making use of Lemma 2.8
and the inequality v(pxy) ≥ σx . The unquestionability statement is simply
a consequence of having obtained v∗ = v′ .
6.3 Symmetric prominence.
In this section, we consider the doctrine that includes both (56) and (57)
and we choose the option that maximizes the (revised) acceptability of tx .
We refer to it as the symmetric prominence method. As a consequence of
including also the clauses (57), the winner need not be the same as the
maximin one. What is more, we will see that a Condorcet winner need not
be the symmetric prominence winner. However, in this doctrine, a Condorcet
winner is always accepted as a prominent option. Besides, the fact that this
doctrine is symmetric under negation ensures also that a Condorcet loser is
always rejected as a prominent option.
The one-step revision transformation v 7→ v′ associated with (56–57)
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takes the following form: For any x, y ∈ A:
v′(tx) = max
(
v(tx), min
y 6=x
v(pxy)
)
, (66)
v′(tx) = max
(
v(tx), min
y 6=x
v(pyx)
)
, (67)
v′(pxy) = max
(
v(pxy), min
(
v(tx), min
z 6=x
z 6=y
v(pzx)
)
, min
(
v(ty), min
z 6=x
z 6=y
v(pyz)
) )
,
(68)
Proposition 6.2. For initial valuations satisfying (58), the symmetric promi-
nence doctrine is unquestionable for all of its propositions and it gives
v∗(tx) = v
′(tx) = σx, (69)
v∗(tx) = v
′(tx) = ρx, (70)
v∗(pxy) = v(pxy), (71)
where σx = miny 6=x v(pxy) and ρx = miny 6=x v(pyx).
Proof. Equalities (69–71) are easily obtained by making use of Lemma 2.8
and the inequalities v(pxy) ≥ σx , v(pxy) ≥ ρy . The unquestionability state-
ment is simply a consequence of having obtained v∗ = v′ .
Corollary 6.3. Whenever there is a Condorcet winner, the symmetric
prominence method accepts it as a prominent option.
Proof. It suffices to notice that x being a Condorcet winner implies σx >
1
2
> ρx .
The symmetric prominence doctrine, formed by clauses (56) and (57) is
symmetric under negation, i. e. the substitution that interchanges tx and
tx as well as pxy and pyx . As a consequence, the preceding proposition is
accompanied here by the following one:
Proposition 6.4. Whenever there is a Condorcet loser, i. e. an option x
such that v(pyx) >
1
2
for any y 6= x, the symmetric prominence method
rejects it as a prominent option.
Remark. In spite of Corollary 6.3, the Condorcet winner can differ from
the symmetric prominence winner, i. e. the option whose prominence gets
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a highest acceptability. A simple example is the following: 3 a ≻ b ≻ c,
2 b≻c≻a, with the following Llull matrix:
a 3 3
2 b 5
2 0 c
, (72)
where one easily checks that the Condorcet winner a gets V ∗(ta)−V
∗(ta) =
3− 2 = 1, but V ∗(tb)− V
∗(tb) = 2− 0 = 2.
6.4 Comprehensive prominence
6.4.1 To the effect of making a single choice, one can go for supplement-
ing the symmetric prominence doctrine (56–57) with two additional clauses
postulating the existence and uniqueness of a prominent option, namely:∨
z∈A tz (existence), and tx → ty (uniqueness). Let us write down all of
these clauses together:
(56) tx ∨
∨
y 6=x
pyx, for any x ∈ A; (73)
(57) tx ∨
∨
y 6=x
pxy, for any x ∈ A; (74)∨
z∈A
tz ; (75)
tx ∨ ty, for any two different x, y ∈ A. (76)
Let us see which clauses derive from (73–76). We begin by combining
pairs of clauses of the form (73), which leads to the following ones:
tx ∨ ty ∨
∨
z 6=x
z 6=y
pzx ∨
∨
z 6=x
z 6=y
pzy, for any two different x, y ∈ A. (77)
One can now combine (74) and (75). This results in∨
z 6=x
tz ∨
∨
z 6=x
pxz, for any x ∈ A. (78)
On the other hand, one can also combine clauses (73) and (76), which gives
ty ∨
∨
z 6=x
pzx, for any two different x, y ∈ A. (79)
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Notice that, in the special case of having only two options, (77), (78) and
(79) coincide respectively with (75), (73) and (74). Finally, for more than
two options one can combine (79) with itself, which leads to
ty ∨
∨
z 6=x
z 6=x′
pzx ∨
∨
z 6=x
z 6=x′
pzx′, for any three different x, x
′, y ∈ A. (80)
In contrast to the doctrines that we have met so far, here one cannot stay
with disjoint resolution. The problem lies in the derivation of (80)x,x′,y from
(79)x,y and (79)x′,y . Therefore, (73–76) is not guaranteed to be ∗-equivalent
to the corresponding Blake canonical form, namely (73–80). In such a situa-
tion, the standard course of action would be using the Blake canonical form.
However, when looking at the rationale behind the clauses that have been
obtained, one sees that they are contained in a more comprehensive doctrine
that seems quite reasonable and worth being adopted in its full generality.
This doctrine, that we will refer to as that of comprehensive promi-
nence, is made up by the following clauses, two of which are indexed by
arbitrary non-empty subsets of A:∨
r∈X
tr ∨
∨
r∈X
s/∈X
psr, for any non-empty X ⊆ A; (81)
ty ∨
∨
r∈X
s/∈X
psr, for any non-empty X ⊆ A, and any y /∈ X ; (82)
tx ∨ ty, for any two different x, y ∈ A; (83)
Clauses (81) and (82) are saying the following: If there exists a non-empty
X ⊆ A such that every r ∈ X is preferred to any s /∈ X , then X contains
at least one prominent option, whereas A \X contains none.
One easily sees that clauses (73), (77), (78) and (75) are particular cases
of (81) (in particular, the existence clause corresponds to the case X = A).
On the other hand, (74), (79) and (80) are particular cases of (82). More
specifically, the only difference between (81–83) and (73–80) is that the latter
is restricted to subsets X of size |X| = 1, 2, N −1, N , where N = |A| .
Therefore, both doctrines are different from each other when N ≥ 5. In this
case, (81–83) contains clauses that cannot be derived from (73–76).
The fact that (81) and (82) are indexed by all possible subsets of A makes
things rather involved. However, we will see that the results are interesting
enough.
The one-step revision transformation v 7→ v′ associated with (81–83) can
be written in the following form: For any x, y ∈ A,
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v′(tx) = max
(
v(tx), max
X⊆A
X∋x
min
(
min
r∈X
r 6=x
v(tr), min
r∈X
s/∈X
v(prs)
) )
, (84)
v′(ty) = max
(
v(ty), max
r 6=y
v(tr), max
∅6=X⊆A
X 6∋y
min
r∈X
s/∈X
v(prs)
)
, (85)
v′(pyx) = max
(
v(pyx), max
X⊆A
X∋x
X 6∋y
min
(
max
(
min
r∈X
v(tr),max
s/∈X
v(ts)
)
, min
r∈X
s/∈X
rs 6=xy
v(prs)
))
,
(86)
where the operators max and min should be understood as giving respec-
tively the values 0 and 1 whenever they are applied to an empty set. Recall
that our aim is to iterate this transformation starting from an initial valua-
tion satisfying (58).
Corollary 6.5. The following equality holds whenever tx is accepted:
v∗(tx) = v
′(tx) = min
s 6=x
v(pxs). (87)
On the other hand, the following one holds for any y :
v∗(ty) = v
′(ty) = max
∅6=X⊆A\{y}
min
r∈X
s/∈X
v(prs). (88)
Proof. It follows from Proposition A.6 on account of the formulas (84–85)
and the initial values (58).
As in the supremacy doctrine, the definite consistency theorem (Theo-
rem 2.4) applied to (76) and (75) guarantees that: (i) when tx is accepted,
then x is the only option with this property, and (ii) when tx is not ac-
cepted for any x ∈ A, then this proposition is undecided for more than one
x ∈ A. In the sequel an option x for which tx is not rejected will be called
a comprehensive prominence winner .
Remark. Notice also that x is the unique comprehensive prominence winner
as soon as v′(tx) > v
′(tx). In fact, starting from this inequality, the unques-
tionability of tx and the fact that v
∗(tx) ≥ v
′(tx) allow us to derive that
v∗(tx) > v
∗(tx).
Proposition 6.6. An option x is a comprehensive prominence winner
if and only if it minimizes v∗(tx).
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Proof. Assume that x is a comprehensive prominence winner. In order to
see that it minimizes v∗(tx) it suffices to notice that the following inequalities
hold for any y 6= x:
v∗(ty) ≥ v
∗(tx) ≥ v
∗(tx), (89)
where the first one holds because of the consistency of v∗ with the uniqueness
clause (76).
Assume now that x minimizes v∗(tx). In order to see that it is a com-
prehensive prominence winner, it suffices to notice that
v∗(tx) ≥ min
z 6=x
v∗(tz) ≥ min
z
v∗(tz) = v
∗(tx), (90)
where the first inequality holds because of the consistency of v∗ with the
existence clause (75).
6.4.2 The comprehensive prominence doctrine has good properties in con-
nection with majority-dominant sets. A set S ⊆ A is said to be majority-
dominant when one has v(pxy) >
1
2
for every x ∈ S and y /∈ S . If both S
and T are majority-dominant, then one must have either S ⊆ T or T ⊆ S .
Otherwise it would be incompatible with (16). As a consequence, there is
always a unique minimal majority-dominant set M . The case of a
Condorcet winner is simply that where the minimal majority-dominant set
consists of a single option.
The notion of minimal majority-dominant set was introduced by Ben-
jamin Ward in 1961 [27], and again by Irving John Good in 1971 [14]. This
set is often called the Smith set (see for instance [25, p. 154]), in reference
to a subsequent work of John H. Smith [24]; however, the latter was not
especially interested in locating the social winner in the minimal majority-
dominant set, but only in looking at the social binary preferences associated
with a general majority-dominant set.
Proposition 6.7. The minimal majority-dominant set M has the following
properties:
v∗(ty) >
1
2
, for any y /∈M , (91)
v∗(tx) ≤
1
2
, for any x ∈M , (92)
v∗(ty) ≤
1
2
, for any y /∈M . (93)
As a consequence, any comprehensive prominence winner is ensured to belong
to M .
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Proof. The inequality (91) follows readily from (88) by taking X = M .
In view of (88), in order to prove (92) we must show that
min
r∈X
s/∈X
v(prs) ≤
1
2
, whenever x ∈M and ∅ 6= X ⊆ A \ {x} . (94)
For X 6⊂ M , this inequality, and even the corresponding strict one, is en-
sured to hold because there exists z ∈ X \M such that v(pxz) > 1/2 and
therefore v(pzx) < 1/2. On the other hand, for X ⊂ M , the minimality of
M guarantees the existence of z ∈ X and y ∈M \X such that v(pzy) ≤ 1/2,
which also ensures (94).
The inequality (93) follows easily from (92) because of the consistency of
v∗ with the clause (83).
Finally, (91) together with (93) says that ty is rejected for any y /∈ M .
Therefore, the comprehensive prominence winner(s) must belong to M .
Corollary 6.8. The comprehensive prominence method complies with the
Condorcet principle (in its majority version M1).
Remark. In the case of x being a Condorcet winner, the strict inclusion
X ⊂M = {x} is not possible for a non-empty set. Therefore, (92) and (93)
hold then with strict inequality, since this is what is obtained in the proof of
Proposition 6.7 for X 6⊂M .
Proposition 6.9. If S ⊆ A is a majority-dominant set, then
v∗(pyx) ≤
1
2
, whenever x ∈ S and y /∈ S . (95)
As a consequence, the comprehensive prominence method accepts pxy for any
x ∈ S and y /∈ S , and this decision is unquestionable.
Proof. In order to establish (95), we will base ourselves on equation (86)
and Lemma 2.8, which allow us to write
v∗(pyx) = max
(
v(pyx), max
X⊆A
X∋x
X 6∋y
min
(
max
(
min
r∈X
v∗(tr),max
s/∈X
v∗(ts)
)
, min
r∈X
s/∈X
rs 6=xy
v∗(prs)
))
.
Now, the consistency of v∗ with the clause (83) implies that v∗(ts) ≤ v
∗(tr)
for any s 6= r . Therefore,
v∗(pyx) = max
(
v(pyx), max
X⊆A
X∋x
X 6∋y
min
(
min
r∈X
v∗(tr), min
r∈X
s/∈X
rs 6=xy
v∗(prs)
))
. (96)
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Let us assume that x ∈ S and y /∈ S . Since we know that v(pyx) <
1
2
,
(95) will be established if we are able to show that
min
(
min
r∈X
v∗(tr), min
r∈X
s/∈X
rs 6=xy
v∗(prs)
)
≤ 1
2
, whenever X ∋ x and X 6∋ y. (97)
In order to obtain this property, we will distinguish two possibilities depend-
ing on whether or not X intersects the minimal majority-dominant set M
considered in the preceding proposition. Let us begin by considering the case
X ∩M 6= ∅ . In this case, (97) holds because of (92). In the special case that
x ∈ M , this argument covers all of the sets X considered in (96–97) (be-
cause X is restricted to contain x). Therefore, (95) is by now established
for S = M . This fact allows us to fix the pending case X ∩M = ∅ . In-
deed, in this case the already obtained result (for S = M ) guarantees that
v∗(pxs) ≤
1
2
for every s ∈M , which values are included in the left-hand side
of (97) (since y /∈ S implies xs 6= xy ).
Since v∗(pxy) ≥ v(pxy) >
1
2
, having obtained (95) ensures that pxy is
accepted for any x ∈ S and y /∈ S . On the other hand, since we have not
only v∗(pxy) > v
∗(pyx), but even v(pxy) > v
∗(pyx), we can be sure that this
decision does not rely on belief derived from unsatisfiable conjunctions.
Remark. The above-remarked fact that (92) holds as a strict inequality when-
ever x is the Condorcet winner entails that (95) holds also as a strict inequal-
ity whenever x is the Condorcet winner and y 6= x.
6.4.3 A bit unexpectedly, the comprehensive prominence winner is often
the same as the maximin one (§ 6.1):
Proposition 6.10. Whenever there is a unique comprehensive prominence
winner, then there is also a unique maximin winner, and they coincide with
each other.
Proof. As it has been remarked, x being the unique comprehensive promi-
nence winner is equivalent to say that tx is accepted, i. e. v
∗(tx) > v
∗(tx).
According to Cor. 6.5, this translates into the first of the next two inequali-
ties:
min
s 6=x
v(pxs) > max
X⊆A\{x}
min
r∈X
s/∈X
v(prs) ≥ min
s 6=y
v(pys). (98)
The second of these inequalities is easily seen to hold for any y 6= x: it
suffices to consider X = {y} in the central expression. Therefore, we get
σx > σy for any y 6= x, i. e. x is the unique maximin winner.
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However, the converse is not true: It may happen that there is a unique
maximin winner but there is not a unique comprehensive prominence winner.
Not only that, a unique maximin winner may even be rejected as a prominent
option. Example: 1 a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d , 1 a ≻ b ≻ d ≻ c, 2 b ≻ c ≻ a ≻ d ,
1 b≻ c≻ d≻ a, 1 c≻ a≻ d≻ b, 1 d≻ a≻ b≻ c, 2 d≻ c≻ a≻ b. The Llull
matrix is
a 6 3 5
3 b 6 5
6 3 c 5
4 4 4 d
, (99)
which shows that the maximin winner d is defeated by any other option!
The possibility of such situations has been pointed out as the main draw-
back of the maximin method [25, p. 212–213]. In contrast, the comprehensive
prominence method definitely rejects d as a prominent choice, and it re-
mains undecided between the other three options (more specifically, one gets
V ∗(tx)−V
∗(tx) = 4−4 = 0 for x = a, b, c and V
∗(td)−V
∗(td) = 4−5 = −1).
This agrees with Proposition 6.7 since here the minimal majority-dominant
set is clearly M = {a, b, c} .
Let us assume that 0.75 of the first vote of the preceding example changes
from a≻b≻c≻d to a≻b≻d≻c. The Llull matrix becomes then
a 6 3 5
3 b 6 5
6 3 c 4.25
4 4 4.75 d
. (100)
From here, the comprehensive prominence method results in V ∗(tx)−V
∗(tx) =
4 − 4 = 0 for x = a, b, c and V ∗(td) − V
∗(td) = 4 − 4.25 = −0.25. In this
case, the minimal majority-dominant set is not {a, b, c} but the whole of
A = {a, b, c, d} . Even so, however, the set of comprehensive prominence
winners still reduces to {a, b, c} . As it will be shown in the next result, this
has to do with the fact that this set has the property of maximizing the
quantity σX = minx∈X, y/∈X v(pxy). From now on, a proper subset of A with
this property will be called a maximin set.
Proposition 6.11. If the set of comprehensive prominence winners is not
the whole of A, then it is contained in the intersection of all the maximin
sets.
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Proof. It suffices to show that the following implication holds for any maxi-
min set: If z /∈ X then z is not a comprehensive prominence winner. This
is a consequence of Corollary 6.5 and Proposition 6.6. In fact, since X maxi-
mizes σX = minx∈X,y/∈X v(pxy), (88) allows to derive that any z /∈ X satisfies
v∗(tz) ≥ v
∗(tx) for any x 6= z . On the other hand, if z were a comprehensive
prominence winner, then Proposition 6.6 ensures that v∗(tz) < v
∗(tx) for any
x that is not such a winner, thus obtaining a contradiction.
In the way that we have defined it in § 6.4.1, the set of comprehensive promi-
nence winners is never empty. Therefore, the preceding proposition has the
following consequence:
Corollary 6.12. It the maximin sets have an empty intersection, then the
comprehensive prominence winner is undecided between the whole of A.
6.4.4 Let us perturb example (99) so that the Condorcet cycle a≻b≻c≻a
becomes uneven. The Llull matrix could take, for instance, the following
value:
a 6 3+2ǫ 5
3 b 6−ǫ 5
6−2ǫ 3+ǫ c 5
4 4 4 d
, (101)
with ǫ > 0. A bit unexpectedly, the comprehensive prominence method does
not select a as the unique winner (which corresponds to breaking the cycle
by the weakest link): for 0 ≤ ǫ < 1
2
, i. e. when the victories within the cycle
are stronger than those outside it, the result is still an undecidedness between
a, b, c (with the same values of V ∗(tx) and V
∗(tx) as for ǫ = 0).
In this example one gets V ∗(tx) = V
′′(tx) = 4 for x = a, b, c. These
values derive from unsatisfiable conjunctions. In fact, they derive through
the concatenation of tx ←
∧
r 6=x tr with tr ←
∧
s 6=d pds for r = a, b, c
as well as td ←
∧
s 6=d psd . This concatenation amounts to the implication
tx ←
∧
s 6=d (psd ∧ pds), whose right-hand side negates the tertium non datur
clauses psd ∨ pds . So the undecidedness between a, b, c as comprehensive
prominence winners is questionable. According to Proposition A.6, what is
unquestionable is the rejection of d .
This suggests that in the event of undecidedness one should restrict the
attention to all the undecided winners and start again the comprehensive
prominence algorithm from the corresponding restriction of the original Llull
matrix. Generally speaking, this progressive elimination could involve several
rounds. We will refer to this procedure as the refined comprehensive
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prominence method. In the preceding example, this procedure selects a
as a single winner.
6.4.5 In the incomplete case, one easily finds examples where the compre-
hensive prominence winner does not coincide with the transitivity one. For
instance: 1 a≻ b≻ c, 1 b≻ c≻ a, 2 c≻ a≻ b, 1 a, 2 b; the ranking pro-
duced by the transitivity doctrine is a≻ b≻ c, whereas the comprehensive
prominence winner is b.
In contrast, in the complete case, there is a strong experimental evidence
that the transitivity winners are always included among the refined compre-
hensive prominence winners. On the other hand, one easily finds examples
where this inclusion is strict. A proof of the stated inclusion is lacking.
A weaker fact, proved by Schulze [22, § 4.8], is the following: In the complete
case, the transitivity winners are included in the union of all the maximin
sets (which union Schulze calls the MinMax set). When there is only one
transitivity winner, then Schulze’s proof is easily adapted to show that this
winner is contained in the intersection of all maximin sets.
7 Goodness
Generally speaking, x being preferred to any other option does not imply
x being good: in fact, x could be the lesser of several evils. In other words,
what we have called supremacy does not imply goodness; as a consequence,
since supremacy does imply prominence, the latter cannot either be identified
with goodness. In fact, goodness has an absolute character: it does not rely
on comparing an option to another, but it makes sense for every option by
itself. On the other hand, preference is related to goodness in the following
way: if x is considered good and y is considered bad, then x is preferred
to y .
So, the doctrine that relates goodness to preference is made of the fol-
lowing clauses, where gx denotes the proposition ‘x is good’: gx ∧ gy → pxy .
In conjunctive normal form:
gx ∨ pxy ∨ gy, for any two different x, y ∈ A; (102)
This doctrine will be referred to as the goodness doctrine. Clearly, it is
symmetric under negation.
Notice that, similarly to § 6.2, here we are admitting the possibility of
having several good options as well as having none of them. To the effect
of making a choice, it makes sense to select the option(s) x for which the
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proposition gx gets a highest acceptability, i. e. a highest value of the differ-
ence v∗(gx)−v
∗(gx). Notice however, that this number could be negative for
all options, which means that no good option is found; in this case we are
choosing the lesser of the evils. On the other hand, it can also happen that
we find several good options. In this case, choosing the one(s) with highest
acceptability corresponds to deciding by a margin (§ 2.2).
We will refer to this procedure as the goodness method, and to its
winners as the goodness winners.
The one-step revision transformation v 7→ v′ associated with the clauses
(102) takes the following form: For any x, y ∈ A:
v′(gx) = max
(
v(gx), max
y 6=x
min
(
v(gy), v(pxy)
) )
, (103)
v′(gx) = max
(
v(gx), max
y 6=x
min
(
v(gy), v(pyx)
) )
, (104)
v′(pxy) = max
(
v(pxy), min
(
v(gx), v(gy)
) )
. (105)
The properties of disjoint resolvability and unquestionability (Prop.A.7)
allow us to express v∗ directly as the result of the one-step transformation
associated with the Blake canonical form, namely:
v∗(gx) = Max
x0=x
min
(
v(px0x1), v(px1x2), . . . , v(pxn−1xn), v(gxn)
)
, (106)
v∗(gy) = Max
xn=y
min
(
v(gx0), v(px0x1), v(px1x2), . . . , v(pxn−1xn)
)
, (107)
v∗(pxy) = max
(
v(pxy), min
(
v∗(gx), v
∗(gy)
) )
, (108)
where the Max operators of (106–107) consider paths x0x1 . . . xn of length
n ≥ 0 with all xi pairwise different (notice that n = 0 corresponds to the
tertium non datur clauses gx ∨ gx and gy ∨ gy ).
7.1 Approval-disapproval voting.
In approval voting each voter is asked for a list of approved options [5].
Clearly, the fraction of voters who approve a given option x can be seen as
the collective degree of belief in the goodness of x, i. e. as the value of v(gx).
The standard approval-voting rule for choosing an option x is simply taking
the one that maximizes v(gx).
Now, from the point of view of this article, in order to make a decision
about gx we should consider also the support for gx . Properly speaking, this
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requires that voters specifically pronounce themselves about it. This idea is
considered in [12], whose CAV rule chooses the option that maximizes the
difference v(gx)− v(gx).
In this section we assume that the votes contain no direct information
about binary preferences. This amounts to having v(pxy) = 0 for any x
and y . In this case, (106–108) reduce to v∗(gx) = v(gx), v
∗(gx) = v(gx) and
v∗(pxy) = min(v(gx), v(gy)). Therefore, the acceptability of gx is simply the
difference v(gx)− v(gx). So the goodness method fully coincides in this case
with the CAV rule.
This rule coincides with that of standard approval voting, i. e. rating the
options by v(gx), in the following two cases: (i) v(gx) = 0, (ii) v(gx) =
1 − v(gx), which correspond respectively to interpreting that (i) non-ap-
proved options are not necessarily disapproved, or contrarily, that (ii) all
non-approved options are disapproved. In the case of interpretation (ii) an
option is accepted as a good one if and only if v(gx) >
1
2
, i. e. if it is approved
by a majority.
7.2 Approval-disapproval-preferential voting.
Let us consider now the case where the individual votes give information
not only about approval or disapproval, but also about binary preferences
that are not a consequence of approval and disapproval. For instance, besides
saying that x and y are both approved (or both disapproved), a voter can
add the information that he prefers y to x. This added information may lead
to the need for revising the degrees of belief about the goodness or badness
of the different options. For instance, it might happen that x is approved
more often than y but at the same time y is preferred to x more often than
x is preferred to y . Such was indeed the case in § 1.2.
With more or less generality, such forms of voting have been considered
by several authors (see [5, ch. 3], [13]). A real example is the 2006 Public
Choice Society election [3], whose actual ballots are listed in [7, §3.3].
The PAV procedure proposed in [4] and [5, § 3.3] gives priority to the
approval information, which decides the winner unless several candidates are
approved by a majority; in this case, the attention is restricted to the set
A∗ of these majority-approved candidates, and the preferential information
about them is used to single out, if possible, their Condorcet winner; if
this is not possible, then the attention is restricted to the minimal majority
dominant subset of A∗ —i. e. the smallest subset M∗ of A∗ with the property
that each x ∈M∗ preferred to any y ∈ A∗\M∗— and the winner is selected
from M∗ by looking again at the approval score.
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Though certainly reasonable, this procedure alternates between approval
and preferential information in a categorical way that does not seem fully jus-
tified. In particular, it is not difficult to set up examples where a tiny prefer-
ence margin between two majority-approved candidates may select a candi-
date approved by a small majority instead of another one that was approved
by a very large majority. Consider, for instance, the following profile:
1
2
+ ε : a≻b |, 1
2
− ε : b |a, (109)
where the parameter ε is assumed to be positive but quite small. One easily
checks that v(ga) =
1
2
+ε , v(gb) = 1, and v(pab) =
1
2
+ε . Therefore, the PAV
procedure gives the victory to a on the basis of a nearly vanishing margin of
preference, in spite of the fact that the approval of b is unanimous whereas
that of a is near to only half the vote.
In contrast, our method carefully gauges the interplay between both kinds
of information in accordance with the doctrine under consideration. The
goodness doctrine that we are considering in this section contains only the
clauses (102) and their derivates (124). More particularly, it does not in-
clude the transitivity of preferences. Having said that, it is interesting to see
that (124) shows that having a chain of preferences from xn to x0 , i. e. hav-
ing pxnxn−1 ∧ ... ∧ px1x0 ∧ px1x0 , implies gxn ∨ gx0 just as well as the direct
preference pxnx0 .
In accordance with the doctrine (102), our proposal to deal with combined
approval and preference information is to iterate the transformation (103–
105) until invariance, and then select the option x with a highest value of
v∗(gx)− v
∗(gx), which we have already called the goodness winner.
For the profile (109) one gets v∗(ga)− v
∗(ga) = 2ε and v
∗(gb)− v
∗(gb) =
1
2
+ ε ; therefore, for small values of ε the goodness winner is b. So the
goodness method does not let a slight margin of preference to prevail over a
big difference in approval. In other cases, however, preferences can overturn
an initial difference in approval. Such a phenomenon occurs for instance in
the following example:
5 : a |b≻c, 4 : b≻c |a, 3 : c |a≻b, 1 : a≻c |b. (110)
The values of V (gx) − V (gx) for x = a, b, c are respectively −1,−5, 3;
so initially —without taking into account the preferential information—
the only approved candidate is c. After revision, however, the values of
V ∗(gx) − V
∗(gx) are respectively 1,−1,−1; so the final decision rejects the
goodness/approval of c and chooses a as the only approved candidate.
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The following result establishes a highly desirable property of monotonic-
ity. Its hypotheses are similar to those of Theorem 2.7 but the conclusion is
stronger.
Theorem 7.1. When applied to approval-disapproval-preferential voting, the
goodness method is monotonic in the following sense: Assume that some votes
are modified by raising x to a better position (with no other change). In this
case, the acceptability of gx either increases or stays constant. Furthermore,
if this acceptability is initially larger than (or equal to) that of gy , then it
remains so after raising x. That is, if
v∗(gx)− v
∗(gx) ≥ v
∗(gy)− v
∗(gy) (111)
for some y , then the same inequality holds after raising x in the votes. And
if the inequality is strict, then it remains so.
Proof. Raising x decomposes into several cases: (i) v(gx) increases; (ii) v(gx)
decreases; (iii) v(pxz) increases; (iv) v(pzx) decreases.
From (106) and (107) we see that, in cases (i) and (iii), v∗(gx) can in-
crease, while v∗(gx) cannot. On the contrary, in cases (ii) and (iv), v
∗(gx)
can decrease while v∗(gx) cannot. This gives the first part of the statement.
Moreover, it follows that the inequality (111) is preserved —as well as its
strict counterpart— if both v∗(gy) and v
∗(gy) stay constant. So it only re-
mains to deal with the case where either v∗(gy) or v
∗(gy) (or both) change.
From now on we assume that this is the case.
Inequality (111) can be rewritten as
v∗(gx)− v
∗(gy) ≥ v
∗(gx)− v
∗(gy). (112)
Although a change in favour of x can also benefit y , we will see, case by
case, that one of the sides of (112) clearly stays constant or changes in the
right direction, whereas the other stays constantly equal to zero.
In connection with formulas (106) and (107) it will be convenient to use
the following notation. Given a path γ = x0x1 . . . xn , we write
vγ := min(v(px0x1), v(px1x2), . . . , v(pxn−1xn)),
including vγ = 1 if γ is an empty path (i.e. n = 0). We understand also
that our paths do not have repeated elements. With this notation, (106) and
(107) take respectively the following form:
v∗(gs) = max
t
γ : s→t
min(vγ , v(gt)), (113)
v∗(gs) = max
t
γ : t→s
min(v(gt), vγ). (114)
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Case (i): v(gx) increases. By (114) it is clear that both v
∗(gx) and v
∗(gy)
stay constant. So, under our assumptions, v∗(gy) does not stay constant.
However, we will prove that it stays equal to v∗(gx), which ensures that
inequality (112) is preserved.
In view of (113), the only way for v∗(gy) to vary with v(gx) is that the
maximum of the right-hand side of (113) for s = y be realized by t = x.
More specifically, one must have
v∗(gy) = max
γ : y→x
min(vγ , v(gx)) = min(M, v(gx)) = v(gx) < M, (115)
where we have set M = max
γ : y→x
vγ . In fact, having v(gx) ≥ M would result
in v∗(gy) staying equal to M . Obviously, (115) will hold as long as v(gx)
remains smaller than M (when v(gx) goes past this value we fall into the
already settled case where both v∗(gy) and v
∗(gy) stay constant).
Using Theorem 2.3 and part (c) of Theorem 2.2, is also clear from (113)
that
v∗(gy) ≥ max
γ : y→x
min(vγ, v
∗(gx)) = min(M, v
∗(gx)) = v
∗(gx), (116)
the last equality being true because otherwise we would get v∗(gy) ≥ M , in
contradiction with (115).
By combining these facts with the inequality v∗(gx) ≥ v(gx), we get
v(gx) = v
∗(gy) ≥ v
∗(gx) ≥ v(gx),
which gives the claimed equality, namely v∗(gy) = v
∗(gx). As it has been
already mentioned, all of this holds as long as v(gx) remains smaller than M ,
and past this value we fall into the already settled case where both v∗(gy)
and v∗(gy) stay constant.
Case (iii): v(pxz) increases for some z 6= x. From (114), v
∗(gx) stays con-
stant. If v∗(gy) increases, then the right-hand side of (112) decreases, so it
changes in the right direction. If v∗(gy) stays constant, then the left-hand
side of (112) changes also in the right direction. So it remains to deal with
the case where v∗(gy) does not stay constant. We will prove that in this case
v∗(gy) stays equal to v
∗(gx), which ensures that inequality (112) is preserved.
Similarly to case (i), the hypothesis that v∗(gy) varies with v(pxz) implies
that
v∗(gy) = max
t6=x,y
γ : y→x
δ: z→t
min (vγ, v(pxz), vδ, v(gt))
= min(M, v(pxz), N) = v(pxz) < M, N, (117)
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where we have set M = max
γ : y→x
vγ and N = max
t6=x,y
δ: z→t
min(vδ, v(gt)). This holds
as long as v(pxz) remains smaller than min(M,N), after which value we fall
into the case where v∗(gy) stays constant.
As before, the inequality v∗(gy) ≥ v
∗(gx) is ensured because of (116),
whose last equality holds now because otherwise we would be in contradiction
with (117).
On the other hand, we can also write
v∗(gx) ≥ max
t6=x
δ : z→t
min(v(pxz), vδ, v(gt)) ≥ max
t6=x,y
δ : z→t
min(v(pxz),min(vδ, v(gt)))
= min(v(pxz), N) = v(pxz), (118)
where the last equality must hold because otherwise we would get v∗(gx) ≥
N , in contradiction with the already known facts that v∗(gx) ≤ v
∗(gy) < N .
So our claim that v∗(gy) stays equal to v
∗(gx) is ensured by the following
chain of inequalities:
v(pxz) = v
∗(gy) ≥ v
∗(gx) ≥ v(pxz),
which hold as long as v(pxz) remains smaller than min(M,N). After this
value we fall into the already settled case where v∗(gy) stays constant.
Cases (ii): v(gx) decreases, and (iv): v(pzx) decreases for some z 6= x. In
view of the symmetry of formulas (106) and (107) it is clear that these cases
are respectively analogous to (i) and (iii). So they are omitted.
Corollary 7.2. Consider the case of approval-disapproval-preferential vot-
ing. Assume that some votes are modified by raising x to a better position
(with no other change). If x was initially a goodness winner, then it remains
so.
8 Recapitulation and concluding remarks
We have been looking at the problem of collectively choosing between a
finite number of options. The traditional view about it focuses on binary
preferences and the fact that the majority criterion often does away with
transitivity. In contrast, here we have taken the view that the problem is not
only about binary preferences, i. e. whether an option is preferred to another,
but also about some notion of choiceness, i. e. whether an option is considered
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a right choice, and about which constraints are imposed on these notions. As
in the traditional view, the majority criterion will often fail at preserving the
assumed constraints.
When several individual opinions are aggregated, every issue, i. e. whether
an option deserves being chosen or whether it is preferable to another, be-
comes valued by the fraction of people who support it. As we have been
doing, it makes sense to think of these numbers as degrees of collective be-
lief that need being revised so as to achieve consistency with the required
constraints.
More specifically, we have restricted ourselves to a revision method that
we introduced in [8] and that uses only the max and min operators. This
automatically excludes such reputed rules as that of Borda and that of Con-
dorcet, Keme´ny and Young [18, 19, 25]. Even so, we still obtain a variety of
known rules as well as some new ones.
Which rule is obtained depends on which constraints are assumed. In
other words, it depends on which notion of choiceness is considered. A com-
mon view in this connection “reduces” choosing to determining a complete
ordering: the right choice is the option that goes first in the right complete
ordering. As we have seen, this notion of choiceness leads to the so-called
method of paths.
Removing transitivity leads to other notions of choiceness, namely suprem-
acy and prominence, that are related respectively to the plurality rule and
the Condorcet principle.
However, none of the preceding notions of choiceness takes into account
whether an option is really good or not. Of course, a good option is preferable
to a bad one. But an option being preferable to another does not imply the
former being good nor the latter being bad.
A single individual might have no better possibility than choosing the
lesser of several evils. However, for a group of people it is not that simple.
As we saw in § 1.2, the collective preferences may be really at odds with
the collective approval information. More specifically, the majority criterion
may give a complete ordering, but it may well happen that the best option
according to this ordering is at the same time the most disapproved one.
In order to resolve such undesirable inconsistencies there is no other solu-
tion than first revealing them, that is, asking the individuals for both kinds
of information, preferences and approval, and then correcting them by means
of an appropriate method.
A method being appropriate means having good properties. In this con-
nection, we have seen that our method discussed in § 7 is monotonic in the
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sense of Theorem 7.1 and its Corollary 7.2. This adds to the general prop-
erties of § 2, such as respect for consistent majority decisions (Theorem 2.5)
and respect for unanimity (Theorem 2.6).
Although the goodness doctrine does not include transitivity, in § 7 we
saw that different options are still compared through paths that involve other
options, as in the transitivity doctrine. This suggests that a doctrine combin-
ing both goodness and transitivity could have also good properties. Another
subject for future work is the application to these doctrines of other meth-
ods that have recently been proposed in the general context of judgment
aggregation [11, 10].
A Appendix: Technical proofs
In order to make sure that the upper revised valuations that we are dealing
with are the right ones, we must use either the Blake canonical form or a
∗-equivalent one. According to [8, Cor. 4.6], in order to prove ∗-equivalence
it suffices to check that the conjunctive normal form under consideration is
disjoint-resolvable as defined in [8, § 4.2].
On the other hand, in order to make sure that the revised degrees of
belief do not derive from unsatisfiable conjunctions, we are interested in the
properties of unquestionability that we mentioned in § 2.5. In order to obtain
such properties, it suffices to check for the sufficient conditions that are given
in [8, Thm. 4.8, Cor. 4.9].
In this appendix we briefly outline these verifications for the doctrines
considered in this article. They are tedious and rather mechanical. It would
be most appropriate to be able to entrust this work to some symbolic pro-
gramming tool. Unfortunately, however, such a tool is not yet available to
us.
Proposition A.1. The transitivity conjunctive normal form (17) is disjoint-
resolvable and therefore ∗-equivalent to the corresponding Blake canonical
form. This doctrine is unquestionable for every pxy .
Scheme of the proof. The Blake canonical form, with the tertium non datur
clauses included, consists of all clauses of the form
px0x1 ∨ px1x2 ∨ . . . ∨ pxn−1xn ∨ pxnx0 , (119)
with n ≥ 1 and all xi (0 ≤ i ≤ n) pairwise different (which restricts n to
be less than or equal to the number of elements of A). These clauses are
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easily derived from (17) by successive concatenation, and suitably ordered
this derivation will use only disjoint resolution.
The unquestionability is easily obtained through condition (a) of
[8, Thm. 4.8], which amounts to the following fact: if two cycles without
repetitions contain opposed links, then suppressing both of these links and
putting together all the others results in a set L of links with the following
property: for any link contained in L there exists a cycle without repetitions
that is included in L and contains that link. The reader will easily convince
himself —maybe by means of some drawings— that this is really a fact.
Proposition A.2. The supremacy conjunctive normal form (21–23) is dis-
joint-resolvable and therefore ∗-equivalent to the corresponding Blake canon-
ical form.
Scheme of the proof. We will limit ourselves to indicating that one can ar-
rive at the Blake canonical form through disjoint resolution by means of
the following procedure: First, each clause of the form (22) is combined by
disjoint resolution with the clause of the same form where x and y are in-
terchanged with each other. This produces the clauses
(24) sx ∨ sy, for any two different x, y ∈ A. (120)
Second, one successively applies disjoint resolution to combine clause (23)
with one or more clauses of the form (22), each of them corresponding to a
different x and admitting any y 6= x. This produces all clauses of the form∨
x∈X
sx ∨
∨
x∈A\X
pxf(x), (121)
where X is any subset of A, and f is any mapping from A \X to A with
f(x) 6= x. The interested reader can go over the rather tedious task of
checking that no further resolution is possible.
Proposition A.3. The supremacy doctrine is unquestionable for sx , i. e. it
satisfies v∗(sx) = v
′(sx), and it is also unquestionable for sx when accepted,
i. e. it satisfies v∗(sx) = v
′(sx) whenever v
∗(sx) > v
∗(sx).
Scheme of the proof. The unquestionability for sx is obtained by checking
that condition (a) of [8, Thm. 4.8] is satisfied for any pair of clauses C,C ′
and any literal q satisfying q, sx ∈ C , q ∈ C
′ and q 6= sx . Finally, the
unquestionability for sx when accepted is obtained by checking that either
condition (a) or condition (b ′ ) of [8, Cor. 4.9] is satisfied in the analogous
situation for sx instead of sx .
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Proposition A.4. The conjunctive normal form formed by the clauses (56)
is disjoint-resolvable and therefore ∗-equivalent to the corresponding Blake
canonical form.
Scheme of the proof. The only possibility for producing new clauses is com-
bining pairs of clauses of the form (56), which results in the following ones:
tx ∨ ty ∨
∨
z 6=x
z 6=y
pzx ∨
∨
z 6=x
z 6=y
pzy, for any two different x, y ∈ A. (122)
One can check that no further resolution is possible.
Proposition A.5. The symmetric prominence conjunctive normal form
(56–57) is disjoint-resolvable and therefore ∗-equivalent to the corresponding
Blake canonical form.
Scheme of the proof. Once again, we will limit ourselves to indicating a path
that allows to arrive at the Blake canonical form through disjoint resolution.
First, we combine pairs of clauses of the form (56), which results in (122).
Second, we combine pairs of clauses of the form (57) to obtain
tx ∨ ty ∨
∨
z 6=x
z 6=y
pxz ∨
∨
z 6=x
z 6=y
pyz, for any two different x, y ∈ A. (123)
One can check that no further resolution is possible.
Proposition A.6. The comprehensive prominence conjunctive normal form
(81–83) is already the Blake canonical form. This doctrine is unquestionable
for tx , i. e. it satisfies v
∗(tx) = v
′(tx), and it is also unquestionable for tx
when accepted, i. e. it satisfies v∗(tx) = v
′(tx) whenever v
∗(tx) > v
∗(tx).
Scheme of the proof. The first statement requires checking that all the would-
be resolutions are absorbed by some clause already present. The unquestion-
ability for tx and the unquestionability for tx when accepted are obtained
respectively from [8, Thm. 4.8] and [8, Cor. 4.9] by checking for their respec-
tive conditions, as in Prop.A.3.
Proposition A.7. The goodness conjunctive normal form, formed by the
clauses (102), is disjoint-resolvable and therefore ∗-equivalent to the corre-
sponding Blake canonical form. This doctrine is unquestionable for any of
the propositions gx and gx .
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Scheme of the proof. The Blake canonical form consists of all clauses of the
form
gx0 ∨ px0x1 ∨ px1x2 ∨ . . . ∨ pxn−1xn ∨ gxn, (124)
with n ≥ 1 and all xi (0 ≤ i ≤ n) pairwise different (which restricts n to
be less than or equal to the number of elements of A). The clauses (124) are
easily derived from (102) by successive concatenation, and suitably ordered
this derivation will use only disjoint resolution.
The unquestionability gx and gx is easily obtained through condition (a)
of [8, Thm. 4.8]. For gx —the case of gx is analogous by symmetry— this
condition requires the following: for any clause C of the form (124) that
includes gx (i. e. xn = x), and any other clause C
′ of the form (124), if C
and C ′ contain respectively q and q , then the would-be resolution C ∨
q
C ′
contains a third clause C1 of the form (124) that still includes gx . The
reader will easily become convinced that it is so, both in the case where
q = gy (y = x0 ) and in the case where q = pab .
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